Value on the college football title board is thin, and the model is blunt about it: only two contracts trade at or below fair value. Alabama, priced at 2c against a 2.6% model estimate, and Oklahoma, at 2c against 2.1%, are the sole names where the price a trader pays sits under the model's probability. Everything above them on the board carries a premium.
That is the whole mispricing story in one line. The same power ratings that feed win-total and title fair value point down the board, not at the market leaders, for the current edge.
How the model flags a mispriced team
The method is simple. Power ratings produce a probability for each outcome, the model converts that into a fair value percentage, and that figure is compared against the cheapest contract price across venues. A best price in cents reads directly as an implied cost: a 2c contract costs the equivalent of 2%.
When the best price sits below fair value, the model sees positive expected value. When it sits above, the trader is paying a premium over the model's estimate. On the current title board, that premium is the rule and the discount is the exception.
The distinction matters more than the headline probability. A favorite can be the likeliest champion and still be a poor contract if its price runs past fair value, while a longshot can carry an edge at a low price.
Which CFB contracts trade below fair value?
Alabama is the cleanest example. The model's fair value is 2.6%, and the best price is 2c on Polymarket, a gap of 0.6 points in the trader's favor. Oklahoma follows, with a 2c best price against a 2.1% fair value.
Neither is a title contender in the market's eyes, and that is the point. The edge the model identifies is not a claim that Alabama or Oklahoma will win; it is a claim that the price undersells the probability. Traders using the Polymarket TGSWC promo would find both contracts at the quoted 2c.
Georgia sits on the line as the reference point: 10c against a 10% fair value, priced exactly where the model puts it. It is neither value nor premium, which makes it the cleanest read of a fairly priced favorite.
Where the market charges a premium
The favorites tell the opposite story. Notre Dame is priced at 12c against a 10.8% fair value, and Indiana at 9c against 7.8%, each a 1.2 point premium over the model. LSU follows at 6c versus 5%, a full point rich.
Ohio State, the model's top team at 11.5% fair value, still trades above it at 12c on Kalshi. Oregon (11c vs 10.6%), Texas (10c vs 9.4%) and Miami (7c vs 6.3%) round out a board where every leader costs more than the model says it should.
That pattern is normal for title markets, where demand concentrates on recognizable names and pushes their prices past fair value. It also explains why the model's flagged value drifts to the lower-probability contracts rather than the top of the board.
Reading the edges without overreading them
A price below fair value is a signal, not a settlement. The Alabama and Oklahoma gaps are narrow in absolute terms, under a point each, and both the model and the market can be wrong. Fair value is an estimate that moves as ratings and news update.
The takeaway is directional. The model sees no edge among the title favorites and a small one in two priced-off contracts, which is a marker of an efficient market at the top and looser pricing in the tail. That is where mispricing tends to live, and where the current board places it.
